An experimental study of leadership institutions in collective action games

Selhan Garip Sahin (), Catherine Eckel and Mana Komai ()
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Selhan Garip Sahin: Rochester Institute of Technology
Mana Komai: St. Cloud State University

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2015, vol. 1, issue 1, No 9, 100-113

Abstract: Abstract We investigate the effectiveness of two leadership institutions in each of two games: a weakest link and a linear public good game. An “Exemplar” leader is a first mover who commits to a level of contribution; a “Manager” is a first mover who makes cheap talk suggestions to the team members. Our results show that both leadership institutions reduce coordination failures as compared to a simultaneous move, baseline scenario with no leader. Although the Manager treatment seems to be slightly more effective at the outset, both leadership institutions significantly and equally improve contributions in the coordination game over time. According to our results none of the leadership institutions seem effective in the linear public good game. This may be due to the fact that our marginal per capita return is rather large, keeping the contribution levels high regardless of the treatment. Subjects who choose to free ride continue to do so with or without leaders, and subjects who choose to be cooperative do not become discouraged by others’ lack of cooperation. These results both replicate earlier findings and allow direct comparison across similar games.

Keywords: Leadership institutions; Coordination failure; Free riding; Weakest link public good game; Linear public good game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C92 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-015-0010-6

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