Peer punishment across payoff equivalent public good and common pool resource experiments

David Kingsley

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2015, vol. 1, issue 2, No 7, 197-204

Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates the effectiveness of peer punishment in non-linear social dilemmas and replicates Cason and Gangadharan (Exp Econ 18:66–88, 2015). The contribution of this replication is that cooperation is quantified across payoff equivalent, strategically symmetric public good and common pool resource experiments. Results suggest that the cooperation-inducing effect of peer punishment is statistically equivalent across conditions. Despite this increase in cooperation, earnings are significantly lower than in the absence of punishment. Institutional features which improve the effectiveness of peer punishment in linear public good experiments may, similarly, make self-governance possible in more complex social dilemmas.

Keywords: Public good; Common pool resource; Experiment; Cooperation; Self-governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-015-0017-z

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