Eliciting and measuring betrayal aversion using the BDM mechanism
Simone Quercia
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2016, vol. 2, issue 1, No 5, 48-59
Abstract:
Abstract Betrayal aversion has been operationalized as the evidence that subjects demand a higher risk premium to take social risks compared to natural risks. This evidence has been first shown by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (J Econ Behav 98:294–310, 2004) using an adaptation of the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism (BDM, Becker et al. Behav Sci 9:226–232, 1964). We compare their implementation of the BDM mechanism with a new version designed to facilitate subjects’ comprehension. We find that, although the two versions produce different distributions of values, the size of betrayal aversion, measured as an average treatment difference between social and natural risk settings, is not different across the two versions. We further show that our implementation is preferable to use in practice as it reduces substantially subjects’ mistakes and the likelihood of noisy valuations.
Keywords: Experiments; Betrayal aversion; Trust game; Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism; Preference elicitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40881-015-0021-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:2:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s40881-015-0021-3
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/40881
DOI: 10.1007/s40881-015-0021-3
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of the Economic Science Association is currently edited by Nikos Nikiforakis and Robert Slonim
More articles in Journal of the Economic Science Association from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().