Investing in institutions for cooperation

Alexander Smith () and Xi Wen ()
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Alexander Smith: Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI)
Xi Wen: Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI)

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2017, vol. 3, issue 1, No 6, 75-87

Abstract: Abstract We examine the effects of endogenizing contribution productivity in a repeated public good game. In our experimental treatment, subjects collectively decide (by voting) how much to invest in augmenting the technology for producing the public good, and subsequently make individual voluntary contributions to provision. In the control, contribution productivity is exogenous. Contributions in the two treatments are similar.

Keywords: Public good games; Endogenous institutions; Production technology; Contribution productivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C91 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-017-0033-2

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