Experienced vs. inexperienced participants in the lab: do they behave differently?

Volker Benndorf (), Claudia Moellers () and Hans-Theo Normann ()
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Volker Benndorf: Goethe University Frankfurt
Claudia Moellers: Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Hans-Theo Normann: Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2017, vol. 3, issue 1, No 2, 12-25

Abstract: Abstract We analyze whether subjects with extensive laboratory experience and first-time participants, who voluntarily registered for the experiment, differ in their behavior. Subjects play four one-shot, two-player games: a trust game, a beauty contest, an ultimatum game, a traveler’s dilemma and, in addition, we conduct a single-player lying task and elicit risk preferences. We find few significant differences. In the trust game, experienced subjects are less trustworthy and they also trust less. Furthermore, experienced subjects submit fewer non-monotonic strategies in the risk elicitation task. We find no differences whatsoever in the other decisions. Nevertheless, the minor differences observed between experienced and inexperienced subjects may be relevant because we document a potential recruitment bias: the share of inexperienced subjects may be lower in the early recruitment waves.

Keywords: Dilemma; Experienced subjects; Laboratory methods; Trust game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-017-0036-z

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