Does exposure to alternative decision rules change gaze patterns and behavioral strategies in games?

Joshua Zonca, Giorgio Coricelli and Luca Polonio ()
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Joshua Zonca: University of Trento
Giorgio Coricelli: University of Trento
Luca Polonio: University of Minnesota

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2019, vol. 5, issue 1, No 2, 14-25

Abstract: Abstract We run an eye-tracking experiment to investigate whether players change their gaze patterns and choices after they experience alternative models of choice in one-shot games. In phase 1 and 3, participants play 2 × 2 matrix games with a human counterpart; in phase 2, they apply specific decision rules while playing with a computer with known behavior. We classify participants in types based on their gaze patterns in phase 1 and explore attentional shifts in phase 3, after players were exposed to the alternative decision rules. Results show that less sophisticated players, who focus mainly on their own payoffs, change their gaze patterns towards the evaluation of others’ incentives in phase 3. This attentional shift predicts an increase in equilibrium responses in relevant classes of games. Conversely, cooperative players do not change their visual analysis. Our results shed new light on theories of bounded rationality and on theories of social preferences.

Keywords: Game theory; Eye-tracking; Bounded rationality; Strategic sophistication; Social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 C72 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-019-00066-0

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