Punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators: Do people discriminate between genders?

Valerio Capraro () and Hélène Barcelo
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Valerio Capraro: Middlesex University London
Hélène Barcelo: Mathematical Science Research Institute

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2021, vol. 7, issue 1, No 2, 19-32

Abstract: Abstract Do people discriminate between men and women when they have the option to punish defectors or reward cooperators? Here, we report on four pre-registered experiments that shed some light on this question. Study 1 (N = 544) shows that people do not discriminate between genders when they have the option to punish (reward) defectors (cooperators) in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with third-party punishment/reward. Study 2 (N = 253) extends Study 1 to a different method of punishing/rewarding: participants are asked to rate the behaviour of a defector/cooperator on a scale of 1–5 stars. In this case too, we find that people do not discriminate between genders. Study 3a (N = 331) and Study 3b (N = 310) conceptually replicate Study 2 with a slightly different gender manipulation. These latter studies show that, in situations where they do not have specific beliefs about the gender of the defector/cooperator’s partner, neither men nor women discriminate between genders.

Keywords: Punishment; Reward; Cooperation; Gender (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D03 D63 D69 D79 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-021-00099-4

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