A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games
Peter Moffatt () and
Graciela Zevallos ()
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Graciela Zevallos: University of East Anglia
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2021, vol. 7, issue 2, No 10, 226-243
Abstract We consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data are used to estimate the parameters of a Stone–Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn–Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.
Keywords: Dictator games; Taking games; Kuhn–Tucker conditions; Experimetrics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 C91 D64 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: A Kuhn-Tucker Model for Behaviour in Dictator Games (2020)
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