Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas: a replication study

Johannes Jarke-Neuert ()
Additional contact information
Johannes Jarke-Neuert: Universität Hamburg

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2023, vol. 9, issue 1, No 9, 123-135

Abstract: Abstract Janssen et al. (Exp Econ 14:547–566, 2014) studied an asymmetric, finitely repeated common-pool resource dilemma with free-form communication in which subjects made decisions about investments in an infrastructure, and about extraction from a resource made available by this infrastructure. They found that infrastructure provision and joint payoffs converged to high levels because structurally advantaged head-enders tend to behave fairly by restricting themselves voluntarily at the extraction stage, and structurally disadvantaged “tail-enders” reciprocate by investing. This paper reports a fully independent, pre-registered, double-blind replication attempt conducted in a different lab, that also supplies elevated statistical power and adheres to the highest principles of scientific transparency and openness. We find that the key results of Janssen et al. not only re-appear qualitatively but are quantitatively and statistically strengthened. The conclusions drawn from the results are therefore robust, and the basic design can be confidently used for follow-up research.

Keywords: Common-pool resources; Asymmetry; Infrastructure; Fairness; Real-time experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 Q25 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40881-023-00131-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:9:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s40881-023-00131-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/40881

DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00131-9

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of the Economic Science Association is currently edited by Nikos Nikiforakis and Robert Slonim

More articles in Journal of the Economic Science Association from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().