Context and preferences for equality in the spectator game

Ingrid Ovidia Telle and Sigve Tjøtta ()
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Ingrid Ovidia Telle: University of Bergen
Sigve Tjøtta: University of Bergen

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2023, vol. 9, issue 2, No 5, 227-238

Abstract: Abstract Spectator games have emerged as a tool for measuring equality preferences. To measure equality preferences, the spectators are matched with a pair of stakeholders who have been allocated unequal endowments. The spectators decide how much to redistribute from one stakeholder’s endowment to the other one. We conducted a spectator experiment in which we fixed the spectators’ redistribution choice set and varied context of the “no distribution” choice. We found a strong effect of the context variation. The spectators who chose not to redistribute the stakeholders’ endowments increased from 12.3 to 38.0% in the treatment, making “no redistribution” more salient.

Keywords: Spectator game; Measurement of inequality; Context (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00140-8

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