Who’s who: how uncertainty about the favored group affects outcomes of affirmative action

Chi Trieu ()
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Chi Trieu: Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) and Compass Lexecon

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2023, vol. 9, issue 2, No 7, 252-292

Abstract: Abstract When affirmative action policies target more than one disadvantaged group, they contain uncertainty as to whether an individual who belongs to one of these groups was actually favored. In a laboratory experiment, we study how this feature affects outcomes of affirmative action in the form of quotas, and compare it with two other conditions, namely affirmative action with a certain favored group and no affirmative action. We find that when a group is favored with certainty and the social identity that triggers affirmative action is made salient, affirmed individuals are wrongly perceived as less competent, both by themselves and by others. Consequently, their willingness to compete does not increase and they are selected less for teamwork post competition. Affirmative action with uncertain favored groups does not distort belief in competence, and thus does not induce such unintended consequences. In contrast, it increases competition entry of the affirmed groups and enhances their chances of being selected for teamwork.

Keywords: Affirmative action; Competition; Uncertainty; Identity; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00143-5

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