Existence and generic stability of cooperative equilibria for multi-leader-multi-follower games

Zhe Yang () and Yan Ju ()
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Zhe Yang: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Yan Ju: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Journal of Global Optimization, 2016, vol. 65, issue 3, No 7, 563-573

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we first introduce the notion of cooperative equilibria in multi-leader-multi-follower games, and then establish an existence theorem. Next, we shift out attention to the generic stability of these cooperative equilibria. After studying the class of games satisfying the sufficient conditions of the existence theorem, we identify a dense residual subset of these games whose cooperative equilibria are all essential.

Keywords: Multi-leader-multi-follower game; Cooperative equilibrium; Generic stability; Essential solution; 91A10; 91A40; 54C60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10898-015-0393-1

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