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Cooperation in dynamic multicriteria games with random horizons

Anna N. Rettieva ()
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Anna N. Rettieva: Institute of Applied Mathematical Research of the Karelian Research Centre of RAS

Journal of Global Optimization, 2020, vol. 76, issue 3, No 2, 455-470

Abstract: Abstract In this paper a new approach to construct the cooperative behavior in dynamic multicriteria games is presented. To obtain a multicriteria Nash equilibrium the bargaining construction (Nash product) is adopted. To design a multicriteria cooperative equilibrium Nash bargaining scheme is applied with the multicriteria Nash equilibrium payoffs playing the role of the status quo points. Dynamic multicriteria bioresource management problem with random harvesting times is considered. The players’ strategies and the payoffs are obtained under cooperative and noncooperative behavior.

Keywords: Dynamic games; Multicriteria games; Random horizon; Nash bargaining solution; Cooperative equilibrium; MSC 91A25; 90B50; 91A12; 91B76 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10898-018-0658-6

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