A New Design for the Patent System

Sam Meng ()
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Sam Meng: University of New England

Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 2019, vol. 10, issue 3, No 16, 1204-1229

Abstract: Abstract Protection of patents is a double-edged sword—while it encourages innovation it causes deadweight loss due to monopolistic production of patented products. The current approach to minimizing the deadweight loss is a compromised one—providing weak patent protection in order to strike a balance between the positive and negative effects of patent rights. Through a scrutiny of the purpose and mechanism of patent protection, this paper suggests a new design for the patent system. This new design aims to stimulate innovation directly while minimizing deadweight loss.

Keywords: Patent law; Optimal patent design; Patent monopoly; Deadweight loss; K11; K12; K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s13132-018-0530-4

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