Enhancing Agricultural Credit Guarantees in China’s Agricultural Value Chain Through Relationship Contracts: A Study on Risk Prevention Mechanisms

Chao Zhang ()
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Chao Zhang: Taiyuan University of Science and Technology

Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 2025, vol. 16, issue 1, No 92, 2650-2669

Abstract: Abstract This research paper delves into the critical role of relationship contracts in mitigating the risk associated with agricultural credit guarantees within China’s complex agricultural value chain. Financial security is paramount for the stability of Chinese society, and this study identifies the fundamental mission of risk prevention in achieving this security. It underscores the significance of relationship contracts formed among agricultural entities in the value chain and the ensuing implications for agricultural credit guarantees. The paper explores various facets, including information asymmetry, the inadequacy of financial regulations, and the collateral challenges faced by farming entities. Through an extensive review of related literature, the research highlights the impact of relationship contracts on default risk, emphasizing the role of intermediary organizations in reducing transaction costs and mitigating performance risks. Moreover, it addresses the need to incentivize new agricultural entities to align their actions with business entities’ expectations. The theoretical framework proposes hypotheses, the first suggesting that relationship contracts have a positive impact on agricultural credit guarantee risk reduction. The second hypothesis examines the mediating effect of moral hazard on these contracts within the agricultural value chain. The research concludes that relationship contracts significantly enhance agricultural credit guarantees by fully or partially guaranteeing agricultural entities’ income, thus reducing risk. Policy implications include the standardization of relationship contracts, the establishment of a reputation mechanism, and the role of agricultural credit guarantee systems as intermediaries to enhance the stability and efficiency of long-term contractual relationships in the agricultural value chain. This study provides valuable insights for policymakers and stakeholders aiming to strengthen China’s agricultural credit guarantee system and promote financial security in the agricultural sector.

Keywords: Agricultural credit guarantees; Relationship contracts; Agricultural value chain; Risk prevention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s13132-024-02003-x

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