Mobile Politicians: Opportunistic Career Moves

Naci Mocan () and Duha T. Altindag ()
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Naci Mocan: Louisiana State University
Duha T. Altindag: Auburn University

Journal of Labor Research, 2024, vol. 45, issue 1, No 3, 58-110

Abstract: Abstract Using information on more than 1,500 elected Members of the Parliament (MPs) and the votes received by political parties in five consecutive elections in Turkey (1991–2011) and employing a controlling strategy, we show that elected MPs are more likely to switch parties after an election if they faced greater electoral uncertainty and experienced a narrowly-won victory. Politicians switch parties after an election to improve their ex-ante re-election probability in the following election, and party-switching MPs are more likely to get elected in the next election. MPs switch parties to move towards the median voter. These results point to forward-looking opportunistic behavior of politicians regarding their strategy to win future elections to have a longer tenure in the Parliament.

Keywords: Politicians; Parliamentarians; Moral hazard; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s12122-024-09353-0

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