Contract design as a risk management tool in corporate acquisitions: theoretical foundations and empirical evidence

Nils Patschureck (), Friedrich Sommer () and Arnt Wöhrmann ()

Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, 2015, vol. 26, issue 4, 279-316

Abstract: This paper provides an overview of contractual measures to reduce acquisition risk for buyers in corporate acquisitions. We distinguish between measures applicable between signing and closing and those used after closing. The most important of these measures are purchase price adjustment agreements, material adverse change clauses, method of payment, earnout agreements, and warranties. We present the theoretical background for each measure as well as results of empirical research. We conclude that adequate contract design can effectively reduce acquisition risk, particularly with respect to target valuation uncertainty stemming from asymmetric information. Despite this potential, empirical research reveals that the use of contractual measures remains underdeveloped and therefore unexploited, especially in Europe. The most important constraints on these contractual measures include complexity, cost of implementation, susceptibility to litigation of sophisticated contract design, and seller bargaining power. The analysis includes suggestions for further research in this area. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Contract design; Risk management; Mergers; Acquisitions; Purchase price agreement; Business valuation; M41; D86; G34; G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s00187-015-0218-x

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