Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Agent-wise–replication invariance, the Walrasian solution and the uniform rule pp. 357-377: William Thomson
The public provision of goods in democracies: Do age and inequality matter? pp. 379-415: Anirban Mitra
Prudent aggregation of quasi-hyperbolic experts pp. 417-444: Bach Dong-Xuan, Philippe Bich and Bertrand Wigniolle
Intellectual property rights protection and the dynamic gains from trade pp. 445-495: Damián Migueles Chazarreta and Ignat Stepanok
Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options pp. 497-517: Xiang Han and Junxiao Zhang
Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents pp. 519-560: Jean-Michel Benkert
Second-home tax and tax avoidance in the housing market pp. 561-601: Xiaokuai Shao and Ming Gao
Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds pp. 603-655: Franz Dietrich and Kai Spiekermann
Are survey stock price forecasts anchored by fundamental forecasts? A long-run perspective pp. 657-685: Pei Kuang, Li Tang, Renbin Zhang and Tongbin Zhang
Central bank communication and stabilization policies under firms’ motivated beliefs pp. 687-721: Camille Cornand and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira

Efficiency and equity in a socially-embedded economy pp. 1-56: Marc Fleurbaey, Ravi Kanbur and Dennis Snower
Hidden advertisement, signaling, and directed search pp. 57-87: Ji-Woong Moon
Expectations, beliefs and the business cycle: tracing back to the deep economic drivers pp. 89-149: Frédéric Dufourt, Kazuo Nishimura and Alain Venditti
Prize-allocation rules in generalized team contests pp. 151-179: Katsuya Kobayashi, Hideo Konishi and Kaoru Ueda
Two families of values for global cooperative games pp. 181-199: J. M. Alonso-Meijide, M. Álvarez-Mozos, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro and A. Jiménez-Losada
Network effects on information acquisition by DeGroot updaters pp. 201-234: Miguel Risco
How strength asymmetries shape multi-sided conflicts pp. 235-274: Sebastian Cortes-Corrales and Paul Gorny
The range of collective accuracy for binary classifications under majority rule pp. 275-300: Lu Hong and Scott E. Page
Momentum in contests and its underlying behavioral mechanisms pp. 301-340: Greg Kubitz, Lionel Page and Hao Wan
The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory pp. 341-356: Shu Huang and Russell Golman

Ambiguity, randomization and the timing of resolution of uncertainty pp. 1021-1045: Benjamin Monet and Vassili Vergopoulos
Dynamically consistent menu preferences pp. 1047-1074: Youichiro Higashi, Kazuya Hyogo and Gil Riella
Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies pp. 1075-1115: Farzad Pourbabaee
How nonlinear benchmark in delegation contract can affect asset price and price informativeness pp. 1117-1168: Jiliang Sheng, Yanyan Yang, Xiaoting Wang and Jun Yang
Optimal labor income taxation with the dividend effect pp. 1169-1201: Alexey Kushnir and Robertas Zubrickas
Price dispersion in dynamic competition pp. 1203-1232: Rafael R. Guthmann
Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs pp. 1233-1273: Siyu Ma, Debapriya Sen and Yair Tauman
Severance savings accounts and life-cycle savings pp. 1275-1331: Rafael Azevedo, Luis Bettoni and Marcelo Santos
Knowledge-based structural change pp. 1333-1388: Kevin Genna, Christian Ghiglino, Kazuo Nishimura and Alain Venditti
Left and right: a tale of two tails of the wealth distribution pp. 1389-1433: Marcello D’Amato, Christian Di Pietro and Marco Sorge

Information exchange through secret vertical contracts pp. 671-707: Jihwan Do and Nicolas Riquelme
Long-run belief-scarring effects of COVID-19 in a global economy pp. 709-752: Wen-Tai Hsu, Hsuan-Chih Lin and Han Yang
Perfect robust implementation by private information design pp. 753-787: Maxim Ivanov
Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences pp. 789-813: Doudou Gong, Bas Dietzenbacher and Hans Peters
Contests on networks pp. 815-841: Alexander Matros and David Rietzke
Auctions with resale at a later date pp. 843-875: Sanyyam Khurana
R &d and market sharing agreements pp. 877-922: Jérôme Dollinger, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
Aggregation of misspecified experts pp. 923-943: Bach Dong-Xuan
Plea bargaining when juror effort is costly pp. 945-977: Brishti Guha
Prediction algorithms in matching platforms pp. 979-1020: Saara Hämäläinen and Vaiva Petrikaitė

Computing perfect stationary equilibria in stochastic games pp. 347-387: Peixuan Li, Chuangyin Dang and P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Existence of Walrasian equilibria with discontinuous, non-ordered, interdependent preferences, without free disposal, and with an infinite-dimensional commodity space pp. 389-401: Konrad Podczeck and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Ranking blame pp. 403-441: Zhuzhu Zhou
A measure of social loss for production economies with externalities pp. 443-474: Maria Graziano and Vincenzo Platino
Non-smooth integrability theory pp. 475-520: Yuhki Hosoya
On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets pp. 521-565: Satoshi Fukuda
An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities pp. 567-592: Tatiana Daddario, Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Preventive-service fraud in credence good markets pp. 593-617: Edi Karni
The value of information in stopping problems pp. 619-648: Ehud Lehrer and Tao Wang
Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences pp. 649-669: Yan Long

Marginal pricing equilibrium with externalities in Riesz spaces pp. 1-27: Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Matías Fuentes
Entrepreneurship and misallocation in production network economies pp. 29-68: Tiago Cavalcanti, Angelo Mendes and Pierluca Pannella
Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests pp. 69-100: Hideo Konishi, Nicolas Sahuguet and Benoit Crutzen
Demand operators and the Dutta–Kar rule for minimum cost spanning tree problems pp. 101-124: Changyong Han, Bawoo Kim and Youngsub Chun
Optimal allocations in growth models with private information pp. 125-154: Tom Krebs and Martin Scheffel
Ambiguity and partial Bayesian updating pp. 155-180: Matthew Kovach
Vertical contracting between a vertically integrated firm and a downstream rival pp. 181-217: Frago Kourandi and Ioannis Pinopoulos
Epictetusian rationality pp. 219-262: Gregory Ponthiere
Diversification and information in contests pp. 263-294: Jorge Lemus and Emil Temnyalov
Information aggregation in large collective purchases pp. 295-345: Itai Arieli, Moran Koren and Rann Smorodinsky