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Pareto-based evolutionary multiobjective approaches and the generalized Nash equilibrium problem

Rodica Ioana Lung, Noémi Gaskó () and Mihai Alexandru Suciu
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Rodica Ioana Lung: Babes-Bolyai University
Noémi Gaskó: Babes-Bolyai University
Mihai Alexandru Suciu: Babes-Bolyai University

Journal of Heuristics, 2020, vol. 26, issue 4, No 5, 584 pages

Abstract: Abstract Pareto-based evolutionary multiobjective approaches are methods that use the Pareto dominance concept to guide the search of evolutionary algorithms towards the Pareto frontier of a problem. To address the challenge of providing an entire set of optimal solutions they use specially designed mechanisms for preserving search diversity and maintaining the non-dominated solutions set. The limitation of the Pareto dominance relation in high-dimensional spaces has rendered these methods inefficient for many-objective optimization. In this paper we aim to exploit existing Pareto-based methods to compute the generalized Nash equilibrium for multi-player games by replacing the Pareto dominance relation with an equilibrium generative relation. The generalized Nash equilibrium extends the Nash equilibrium concept by considering constraints over players’ strategies. Numerical experiments indicate that the selected methods can be employed for equilibria computation even for games with up to twenty players.

Keywords: Generalized Nash equilibrium problem; Multi-objective optimization; Evolutionary algorithms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s10732-020-09438-w

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