Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers

Amihai Glazer and Hiroki Kondo ()

Journal of Population Economics, 2015, vol. 28, issue 2, 509-533

Abstract: If an altruist is expected to aid a person with low utility, that person may be induced to save little. Such behavior generates a good Samaritan dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. Governmental transfers, which restrict reallocation from a person who saves much to one who saves little, reduce the effect and can lead to an outcome which is Pareto-superior to the outcome under a Nash equilibrium with no government taxation and transfers. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Social security; Moral hazard; Savings; Altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Governmental Transfers and Altruistic Private Transfers (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00148-014-0503-2

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