Housing market regulations and strategic divorce propensity in China
James Alm (),
Weizheng Lai () and
Xun Li ()
Additional contact information
Weizheng Lai: University of Maryland
Xun Li: Wuhan University
Journal of Population Economics, 2022, vol. 35, issue 3, No 10, 1103-1131
Abstract In China’s regulated housing markets, a married couple may choose strategically to divorce in order to purchase more houses and/or purchase with more favorable financial conditions. Our study examines the propensity for strategic divorce induced by housing market regulations in China. To overcome the difficulty of using conventional divorce data to distinguish between a “true” divorce and a strategic (or a “fake”) divorce, we design an identification strategy using data on internet searches for divorce- and marriage-related keywords in 32 Chinese major cities from 2009 through 2016. Our difference-in-differences estimates provide robust evidence that housing market regulations significantly increase the propensity for strategic divorce. Our results also show that the increase in the propensity for strategic divorce is weaker in cities with higher male–female ratios and with stronger Confucian ideologies. These findings point to the role that housing market regulations play in distorting a family’s choices, as well as to the importance for policymakers to consider unintended impacts of regulations.
Keywords: Housing market regulations; Strategic divorce; Baidu Index; D78; J12; J18; L50; R21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00148-021-00853-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Working Paper: Housing Market Regulations and Strategic Divorce Propensity in China (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:35:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s00148-021-00853-2
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... tion/journal/148/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Population Economics is currently edited by K.F. Zimmermann
More articles in Journal of Population Economics from Springer, European Society for Population Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().