Political Instability and Illegal Immigration

Jose Edgardo L Campos and Donald Lien

Journal of Population Economics, 1995, vol. 8, issue 1, 23-33

Abstract: Economic theory suggests that transnational migration results from the push-pull effect of wage differentials between host and source countries. In this paper, we argue that political instability exacerbates the migration flow, with greater instability leading to relatively larger flows. We conclude then that an optimal solution to the illegal immigration problem requires proper coordination of immigration and foreign policies by the host country. A narrow preoccupation with tougher immigration laws is wasteful and may be marginally effective.

Date: 1995
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