Bequests as a heir "discipline device"

Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau

Journal of Population Economics, 1996, vol. 9, issue 4, 405-414

Abstract: This paper develops a model of inter vivos gifts and bequests in a setting of moral hazard and adverse selection. Altruistic parents do not perfectly know how much effort their children make to earn their living, nor do they know their true level of ability. Inter vivos gifts take place prior to the realization of the children`s earnings whereas at the moment of bequests, parents do observe them. We show that an optimal transfer policy generally uses a mix of inter vivos gifts - deemed as more efficient - and bequests - deemed as more redistributive. JEL classifications: J1, J13

Keywords: Bequests; · (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 J13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
Note: Received May 2, 1995 / Accepted September 21, 1995
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bequests as a Heir "Discipline Device." (1996)
Working Paper: Bequests as a heir ``discipline device'' (1996)
Working Paper: Bequests as a heir: "Discipline device" (1993)
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