A New Sufficient Condition for a Berge Equilibrium to be a Berge–Vaisman Equilibrium

Bertrand Crettez ()
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Bertrand Crettez: Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, CRED, EA 7321

Journal of Quantitative Economics, 2017, vol. 15, issue 3, No 2, 459 pages

Abstract: Abstract In a Berge equilibrium each player is supported by his teammates in the sense that all the other players maximize his utility. A Berge equilibrium in which each player’s payoff is no lower than his maximin gain is called a Berge–Vaisman equilibrium. We propose and study a new sufficient condition for Berge equilibrium to be a Berge–Vaisman equilibrium. A Berge equilibrium is a Berge–Vaisman equilibrium if no individual equilibrium strategy is strongly dominated. We also give a necessary and sufficient condition for a Berge equilibrium to be a Berge–Vaisman equilibrium in two-player-two-action games.

Keywords: Berge equilibrium; Berge–Vaisman equilibrium; Sufficient Condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40953-016-0066-z

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