Electoral Cycles and Project Outcomes

Saibal Ghosh

Journal of Quantitative Economics, 2018, vol. 16, issue 2, No 8, 527-552

Abstract: Abstract Using a novel dataset on announced project-level investments, we examine the determination of project outcomes and the role of elections. Using India as a case study, the findings suggest that projects announced by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exhibit a lower probability of completion. Furthermore, we show that projects announced by SOEs have a higher probability of being abandoned. Our results are consistent with the political view of government ownership where elected representatives make investment promises that are subsequently reneged.

Keywords: Project; Abandoned; State-owned; Election; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40953-017-0080-9

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