Local Leadership and Public Good: Evidence from The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India

Ronit Mukherji ()
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Ronit Mukherji: The University of British Columbia

Journal of Quantitative Economics, 2019, vol. 17, issue 2, No 4, 329 pages

Abstract: Abstract The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme is unique in combining self-selection of beneficiaries through demand for work and decentralization of administrative power at the local level. However it falls into a pitfall associated with the decentralization mechanism: that of capture of funds by local leaders. Using nationally representative data I find how households which are closer to local leaders do much better in the NREG scheme during the different stages of its implementation as compared to households who are not. They have more job cards, they tend to work, among those working work more days and get faster wage payments. I argue how this is a result of favouritism by these local leaders leading to capture of funds.

Keywords: NREGS; Decentralization; Local capture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s40953-018-0138-3

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