Unilateral Support Equilibrium, Berge Equilibrium, and Team Problems Solutions

Bertrand Crettez ()
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Bertrand Crettez: Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, CRED, EA 7321

Journal of Quantitative Economics, 2019, vol. 17, issue 4, No 2, 727-739

Abstract: Abstract We compare two notions of equilibrium for other-regarding agents, namely Berge and unilateral support equilibria. A Berge equilibrium is a strategy profile such that the teammates of each agent choose their strategies in order to maximize his utility. A unilateral support equilibrium is a strategy profile such that the teammates of each agent non-cooperatively choose their strategies to maximize his utility. By definition the level of cooperation in a unilateral support equilibrium is no higher than in a Berge equilibrium. Yet, relying on ideas from Team theory, we provide conditions under which a unilateral support equilibrium is also a Berge equilibrium. We also provide conditions under which a unilateral support equilibrium is a Berge–Vaisman equilibrium, i.e., a strategy profile which is a Berge equilibrium and such that the payoff of each player is no lower than his maximin value.

Keywords: Berge equilibrium; Berge–Vaisman equilibrium; Berge–Nash equilibrium; Unilateral support equilibrium; Team optimal solution; Person-by-person optimal solution; Mutually beneficial practice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40953-019-00168-w

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