Lower Corruption Warrants Less, but Higher Corruption Removes it: A Ricardian Note

Biswajit Mandal

Journal of Quantitative Economics, 2022, vol. 20, issue 2, No 10, 479-486

Abstract: Abstract This short note uses a textbook kind competitive Ricardian model to check if any change in institutional factor reflecting corruption related intermediation may lead to apparently surprising outcome. I use the idea of finite change in international trade theory to argue how raising the degree of corruption related intermediation cost eventually removes corruption from the system. So, an initial surge in the cost of corruption may turn out to be a welcome change.

Keywords: International trade; Ricardian model; Corruption; F1; F11; D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 F1 F11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40953-022-00287-x

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