Carbon Tax in a Triopoly with Environmental R&D and Knowledge Spillovers

Chenyu Wang () and Gamal Atallah
Additional contact information
Chenyu Wang: Hunan Institute of Science and Technology, School of Economics and Management
Gamal Atallah: University of Ottawa, Department of Economics

Journal of Quantitative Economics, 2025, vol. 23, issue 4, No 6, 1117-1144

Abstract: Abstract In a three-stage game-theoretic framework, we build a triopoly model characterized by environmental research and development (R&D) and knowledge spillovers. This study analyzes the effects and implications of environmental technology policies on a polluting triopoly with environmental R&D and knowledge spillovers. In particular, we (i) compare the economic–environmental performance of regimes of R&D competition, R&D partial cartelization, and R&D full cartelization under non-commitment and commitment scenarios; (ii) examine stability conditions between insiders and an outsider in R&D partial cartelization under non-commitment and commitment scenarios; and (iii) investigate the full rank of the firm- and industrial-level variables under different cases. This study provides practical insights into the optimal design of environmental technology policies for government, enterprises, and consumers under a unified analysis framework.

Keywords: Environmental economics; Industrial organization; Triopoly; Carbon tax; Environmental R&D; Knowledge spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L51 O33 Q55 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40953-025-00467-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jqecon:v:23:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s40953-025-00467-5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40953

DOI: 10.1007/s40953-025-00467-5

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Quantitative Economics is currently edited by Dilip Nachane and P.G. Babu

More articles in Journal of Quantitative Economics from Springer, The Indian Econometric Society (TIES) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().