Quality of strong equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing

György Dósa () and Leah Epstein ()
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György Dósa: University of Pannonia
Leah Epstein: University of Haifa

Journal of Scheduling, 2019, vol. 22, issue 4, No 7, 473-485

Abstract: Abstract The bin packing problem deals with packing items of sizes no larger than 1 into unit capacity bins. Here, we analyze a class of bin packing games where the cost of an item is 1 over the total number of items packed into its bin, which is a bin packing congestion game. We study strong equilibria and find the tight values of the SPoA and SPoS, that is, asymptotic approximation ratios of the worst and best strong equilibria. We show that these values are approximately 1.69103 and 1.611824, respectively. In particular, we observe that the two values are not equal, showing a difference from other known kinds of cost sharing approaches.

Keywords: Bin packing; Price of anarchy; Strong equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s10951-018-0587-8

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