EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Sequential solutions in machine scheduling games

Cong Chen, Paul Giessler, Akaki Mamageishvili (), Matúš Mihalák and Paolo Penna
Additional contact information
Cong Chen: Guangzhou University
Paul Giessler: Maastricht University
Akaki Mamageishvili: Offchain Labs
Matúš Mihalák: Maastricht University
Paolo Penna: IOG

Journal of Scheduling, 2024, vol. 27, issue 4, No 4, 363-373

Abstract: Abstract We consider the classical machine scheduling, where n jobs need to be scheduled on m machines, and where job j scheduled on machine i contributes $$p_{ij}\in \mathbb {R}$$ p ij ∈ R to the load of machine i, with the goal of minimizing the makespan, i.e., the maximum load of any machine in the schedule. We study the inefficiency of schedules that are obtained when jobs arrive sequentially one by one, and the jobs choose the machine on which they will be scheduled, aiming at being scheduled on a machine with a small load. We measure the inefficiency of a schedule as the ratio of the makespan obtained in the worst-case equilibrium schedule, and of the optimum makespan. This ratio is known as the sequential price of anarchy (SPoA). We also introduce two alternative inefficiency measures, which allow for a favorable choice of the order in which the jobs make their decisions. As our first result, we disprove the conjecture of Hassin and Yovel (Oper Res Lett 43(5):530–533, 2015) claiming that the sequential price of anarchy for $$m=2$$ m = 2 machines is at most 3. We show that the sequential price of anarchy grows at least linearly with the number n of players, assuming arbitrary tie-breaking rules. That is, we show $${\textbf {SPoA}} \in \Omega (n)$$ SPoA ∈ Ω ( n ) . At the end of the paper, we show that if an authority can change the order of the jobs adaptively to the decisions made by the jobs so far (but cannot influence the decisions of the jobs), then there exists an adaptive ordering in which the jobs end up in an optimum schedule.

Keywords: Machine scheduling; Price of anarchy; Price of stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10951-024-00810-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jsched:v:27:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10951-024-00810-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10951

DOI: 10.1007/s10951-024-00810-3

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Scheduling is currently edited by Edmund Burke and Michael Pinedo

More articles in Journal of Scheduling from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:spr:jsched:v:27:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10951-024-00810-3