All-pay auctions as models for military annexation

Benjamin Kang and James Unwin ()
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Benjamin Kang: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
James Unwin: University of Illinois at Chicago

Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, 2022, vol. 15, issue 2, No 1, 145-160

Abstract: Abstract We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. We derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios.

Keywords: Conflict; War; All-pay auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s12076-022-00306-8

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