Opting for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in Uganda: a non-cooperative game

Arthur Ssebbugga-Kimeze ()
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Arthur Ssebbugga-Kimeze: Harvard University

Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 2022, vol. 27, issue 6, No 1, 11 pages

Abstract: Abstract This study applies the structure of a pay-off matrix to assess the social dilemma of buying a (more expensive) plug-in hybrid vehicle instead of importing a standard internal combustion engine car into Uganda. Similarities between the quadrants are more pronounced when the prisoner’s dilemma is extended from n = 2 to a large n. The treatment in this paper is extended to reflect the game being played by the average number of new vehicle registrations by the Uganda Revenue Authority (n = 41,960). From the “per capita society pay-off” in the climate change mitigation action dilemma, having one free rider against a greater number of cooperating players bears similar results to having a win–win situation in the 2-person prisoner’s dilemma. Having one sucker versus many defectors is very similar to the tragedy of the commons. The prisoner’s dilemma game extended to n players results in the same prediction; Nash equilibrium of the game is that none of the agents cooperates. Rational agents defect in an n-person non-cooperative game. The paper discusses cognitions for each of the quadrants in the pay-off matrix as well as limitations of applying this simple matrix to this question. The paper proposes coercion and incentives to solve the prisoner’s dilemma in the Uganda context.

Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma; Pay-off matrix; PHEV; Kiira EV (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s11027-022-10016-7

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