A non-zero-zum War of Attrition

Victor Baston and Andrej Garnaev

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 1997, vol. 45, issue 2, 197-211

Abstract: The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a game of timing in which the players have a probability of learning when their opponent acts. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium when both players are non-noisy but that there are many Nash equilibria including pure ones when at least one of the players is noisy. Explicit expressions for the strategies used in these Nash equilibria are obtained. Copyright Physica-Verlag 1997

Keywords: War of attrition; Nash equilibrium; game of timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01193860

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