Population monotonic allocation schemes on externality games

F. Grafe, Elena Inarra and J. M. Zarzuelo

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 1998, vol. 48, issue 1, 80 pages

Abstract: This paper introduces a new class of cooperative games called externality games. In these games each player contributes with their specific endowment and also with their presence to the total worth of the coalition she belongs to. We prove that for these games there exists a unique efficient, anonymous and population monotonic rule: the proportional rule. A subclass of externality games is also analyzed. Games in this subclass are not necessarily convex although we show that the Shapley value is in the core of these games, but it is not a population monotonic rule. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Keywords: Key words: Cooperative games; Shapley value; population monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001860050012 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:48:y:1998:i:1:p:71-80

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/00186

DOI: 10.1007/s001860050012

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research is currently edited by Oliver Stein

More articles in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research from Springer, Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR), Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().