Determinateness of strategic games with a potential

Henk Norde and Stef Tijs

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 1998, vol. 48, issue 3, 377-385

Abstract: Finite potential games are determined, i.e have Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In this paper we investigate the determinateness of potential games, in which one or more players have infinitely many pure strategies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Keywords: Key words: Potential game; approximate equilibria; determinateness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:48:y:1998:i:3:p:377-385

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DOI: 10.1007/s001860050034

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