The position value for union stable systems
E. Algaba,
J. M. Bilbao,
Peter Borm and
J. J. López
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2000, vol. 52, issue 2, 236 pages
Abstract:
In this paper, we study the position value for games in which partial cooperation exist, that is based on a union stable coalition system. The concept of basis is introduced for these systems, allowing for a definition of the position value. Moreover, an axiomatic characterization of the position value is provided for a specific class of union stable systems. Conditions under which convexity is inherited from the underlying game to the conference game, and the position value is a core vector of the restricted game are provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000
Keywords: 1991 Mathematics Subject Classification: 90D12; Key words: Union stable systems; conference game; position value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Working Paper: The position value for union stable systems (2000) 
Working Paper: The position value for union stable systems (1998) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:52:y:2000:i:2:p:221-236
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DOI: 10.1007/s001860000060
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