On a game in manufacturing

V. J. Baston and A. Y. Garnaev

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2000, vol. 52, issue 2, 237-249

Abstract: We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved that a Nash equilibrium is unique if it exists and that a Nash equilibrium exists when the capital costs of the players are zero or when the players are equal in every respect. However, when the capital costs differ, in general a Nash equilibrium exists only when the players' capital costs are high compared to their profit rates. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Keywords: Key words: Game theory; Nash equilibrium; game of timing; non-zero sum game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:52:y:2000:i:2:p:237-249

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DOI: 10.1007/s001860000075

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