The Shapley value for games on matroids: The static model

J. M. Bilbao, T. S. H. Driessen, A. Jiménez Losada and E. Lebrón

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2001, vol. 53, issue 2, 333-348

Abstract: In the classical model of cooperative games, it is considered that each coalition of players can form and cooperate to obtain its worth. However, we can think that in some situations this assumption is not real, that is, all the coalitions are not feasible. This suggests that it is necessary to rise the whole question of generalizing the concept of cooperative game, and therefore to introduce appropriate solution concepts. We propose a model for games on a matroid, based in several important properties of this combinatorial structure and we introduce the probabilistic Shapley value for games on matroids. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Keywords: Key words: Cooperative game; matroid; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001860100111 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:53:y:2001:i:2:p:333-348

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/00186

DOI: 10.1007/s001860100111

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research is currently edited by Oliver Stein

More articles in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research from Springer, Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR), Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().