Subgame perfect equilibria in model with bargaining costs varying in time

Agnieszka Rusinowska

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2002, vol. 56, issue 2, 303-313

Abstract: The paper presents the bargaining model in which preferences of each player are expressed by the sequence of bargaining costs varying in time. There are theorems describing subgame perfect equilibria for some models with the bargaining costs varying in time. In the class of strategies independent of the former history, a delay in reaching an agreement of subgame perfect equilibrium is impossible. However, if strategies depend on the former history of the game, then an agreement can be reached with delay. An adequate example in which a delay appears is presented. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Keywords: Key words: bargaining costs; subgame perfect equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:56:y:2002:i:2:p:303-313

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DOI: 10.1007/s001860200219

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