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An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value for cooperative games on antimatroids

E. Algaba (), J. M. Bilbao (), Rene van den Brink () and A. Jiménez-Losada ()

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2004, vol. 59, issue 1, 147-166

Abstract: Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games in which coalition formation is restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalizes permission structures. These games group several well-known families of games which have important applications in economics and politics. The current paper establishes axioms that determine the restricted Banzhaf value for cooperative games on antimatroids. The set of given axioms generalizes the axiomatizations given for the Banzhaf permission values. We also give an axomatization of the restricted Banzhaf value for the smaller class of poset antimatroids. Finally, we apply the above results to auction situations. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Antimatroid; Cooperative game; Permission structure; Banzhaf value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s001860300307

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