A non-cooperative approach to the cost spanning tree problem

Gustavo Bergantiños and Leticia Lorenzo ()

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2004, vol. 59, issue 3, 393-403

Abstract: We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative game, which is inspired by a real-life problem. We study the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. We prove that these equilibria are closely related with situations where agents connect sequentially to the source. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Cost spanning tree problem; Equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s001860400352

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