Cost allocation games with information costs

Stefano Moretti () and Fioravante Patrone ()

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2004, vol. 59, issue 3, 419-434

Abstract: We propose a simple model which embeds cost allocation games into a richer structure to take into account that information on costs can be itself costly. The model is an outgrowth of experience on cost allocation for consortia of municipalities dealing with garbage collection. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Cost allocation; TU games; Information costs; Fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s001860400353

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