The position value in communication structures

E. Algaba, J. M. Bilbao () and J. J. López

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2004, vol. 59, issue 3, 465-477

Abstract: We study cooperation structures with the following property: given any two feasible coalitions with non-empty intersection, its union is a feasible coalition again. TU-games restricted by union stable systems generalize graph-restricted games and games with permission structures. A study about the differences between the position value in union stable systems and hypergraph communication situations is given. Moreover, some computational aspects related to position value in union stable systems are discussed. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Position value; Communication situations; Permission structures; Hypergraph communication situations; Union stable systems; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s001860400343

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