On the design of voting games

Francesc Carreras ()

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2004, vol. 59, issue 3, 503-515

Abstract: By focusing on the protectionist tendency found in the design of voting games, a thorough analysis is provided for the role of blocking coalitions in a simple game. We characterize those blocking families that univocally determine the game, and show that otherwise at least three games share a given nonempty blocking family, also giving an upper bound for the number of such games. Some examples illustrate the application of these ideas to political science. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Simple game; Voting design; Protectionism; Blocking coalition; 91A12; 91A40; 91A80; 91B12; 91B74; 91F10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s001860400344

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