The Shapley Valuation Function for Strategic Games in which Players Cooperate
Luisa Carpente,
Balbina Casas-Méndez,
Ignacio García-Jurado and
Anne Nouweland ()
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2006, vol. 63, issue 3, 435-442
Abstract:
In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lower-value based method to associate coalitional games with strategic games that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2005). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2006
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00186-005-0028-2 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:63:y:2006:i:3:p:435-442
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/00186
DOI: 10.1007/s00186-005-0028-2
Access Statistics for this article
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research is currently edited by Oliver Stein
More articles in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research from Springer, Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR), Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().