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The Shapley Valuation Function for Strategic Games in which Players Cooperate

Luisa Carpente, Balbina Casas-Méndez, Ignacio García-Jurado and Anne Nouweland ()

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2006, vol. 63, issue 3, 435-442

Abstract: In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lower-value based method to associate coalitional games with strategic games that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2005). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2006

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s00186-005-0028-2

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