A model of a 2-player stopping game with priority and asynchronous observation

David Ramsey ()

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2007, vol. 66, issue 1, 149-164

Abstract: Various models of 2-player stopping games have been considered which assume that players simultaneously observe a sequence of objects. Nash equilibria for such games can be found by first solving the optimal stopping problems arising when one player remains and then defining by recursion the normal form of the game played at each stage when both players are still searching (a 2 × 2 matrix game). The model considered here assumes that Player 1 always observes an object before Player 2. If Player 1 accepts the object, then Player 2 does not see that object. If Player 1 rejects an object, then Player 2 observes it and may choose to accept or reject it. It is shown that such a game can be solved using recursion by solving appropriately defined subgames, which are played at each moment when both players are still searching. In these subgames Player 1 chooses a threshold, such that an object is accepted iff its value is above this threshold. The strategy of Player 2 in this subgame is a stopping rule to be used when Player 1 accepts this object, together with a threshold to be used when Player 1 rejects the object. Whenever the payoff of Player 1 does not depend on the value of the object taken by Player 2, such a game can be treated as two optimisation problems. Two examples are given to illustrate these approaches. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2007

Keywords: Stopping game; Nash equilibrium; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/s00186-006-0136-7

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