Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom

Anna Khmelnitskaya () and Elena Yanovskaya

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2007, vol. 66, issue 2, 255-261

Abstract: We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without the additivity axiom similarly as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen’s one by the replacement of additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the Owen value suggested by Winter for games with level structure is valid as well. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2007

Keywords: Cooperative TU game; Coalitional structure; Owen value; Axiomatic characterization; Marginality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00186-006-0119-8

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