On stochastic games in economics

Andrzej Nowak

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2007, vol. 66, issue 3, 513-530

Abstract: In this paper we show that many results on equilibria in stochastic games arising from economic theory can be deduced from the theorem on the existence of a correlated equilibrium due to Nowak and Raghavan. Some new classes of nonzero-sum Borel state space discounted stochastic games having stationary Nash equilibria are also presented. Three nontrivial examples of dynamic stochastic games arising from economic theory are given closed form solutions. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2007

Keywords: C73; E23; Stochastic games; Stationary equilibria; Supermodular games; Games with complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00186-007-0167-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:66:y:2007:i:3:p:513-530

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/00186

DOI: 10.1007/s00186-007-0167-8

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research is currently edited by Oliver Stein

More articles in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research from Springer, Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR), Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().