A pairwise-monotonic core selection for permutation games

Silvia Miquel ()

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2009, vol. 70, issue 3, 465-475

Abstract: In this article, a single-valued solution for permutation games is proposed. If we consider that each agent on the permutation game acts both as a buyer and as a seller, a related assignment game with the same reward matrix is defined. In this two-sided related market, the midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation is considered. Then, each agent in the permutation game merges his payoff as a buyer and his payoff as a seller. This solution belongs to the core of the one-sided market and it is pairwise-monotonic. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2009

Keywords: Permutation game; Core; Pairwise-monotonicity; τ-value; 91A12; 91A40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1007/s00186-008-0281-2

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